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trade-marked goods is extremely dubious. Consumers know best the prices of
the things they purchase most often. Closely related to this anti-monopoly
argument is the contention that the consumer benefits from resale price main-
tenance because loss-leader tactics are eliminated~5 This argument also rests
upon the assumption of consumer irrationality. Whether the consumer should
be protected by law from his own irrational behavior about variations in price
is still an open question.
The basic issue of the Miller-Tydings Act is whether it should be the policy
of the United States to encourage the growth of retail combinations. It is true
that there is an express provision in the Miller-Tydings Amendment and in the
fair trade acts against horizontal combinations, but unless the spirit of these
provisions was violated, the fair trade movement would make little economic
sense. The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have
claimed that the great majority of fair trade agreements in interstate commerce
are probably in violation of the provision against horizontal combinations. But
the anti-trust enforcement agencies do not have sufficient funds to investigate
all the contracts made and to enforce the provision against horizontal combina-
tions s9 If they did, the fair trade acts would in effect become something very
different, and of much less economic interest and importance.
TRADE ASSOCIATION STATISTICS AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS
Most trade associations in the United States have engaged at one time or an-
other in collecting and distributing industry statistics. The movement is usu-
ally said to date from the publication in 1912 of Mr. A. J. Eddy's book The
New Competition, which had as its thesis that "[tirue competition begins with
58 One of the early bills introduced to legalize resale price maintenance contracts in inter-
state commerce (the Stephans Bill introduced in the 64th Congress) was presented as a bill
"to protect the public against dishonest advertising and false practices in merchandising."
The Fair Trade League was the chief sponsor of the bill and at the annual meeting of the
League the following dialogue took place:
Mr. Arend: Is it in the best form to get what we want? Has it a false caption? It has as I
look at it.
Mr. Geissler: I don't think it is ambiguous. I thought the sops included were advantages-
trading points, so to speak.
And later Mr. Arend said, "I am skeptical about the consumer arguments .... I don't like
the sham in it." FTC, op. cit. supra note r8, at 45-47.
The most careful analysis of the economic advantages to the consumer of resale price main-
tenance was made by Prof. F. W. Taussig; he decided that the consumer arguments were not
to be taken seriously enough to warrant a conclusion favorable to resale price maintenance.
6 Am. Econ. Rev. Supp. i5 (i916).
There have been several statistical studies of the effect of fair trade agreements on prices
and the studies, while inconclusive, have all indicated that prices of the same products are
higher in fair trade states than in the non-fair trade states. See FTC, op. cit. supra, at XLV-L.
59 See note 51 supra.
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the development of conditions that tend to eliminate secrecy in bidding and
charging."'
Under "open competition" plans, co-operative exchange of one or more of
three types of information is supposed to eliminate cutthroat methods at-
tributed to ignorance of true market conditions. It is thought that sellers with
no reliable information as to their competitors' prices frequently are victimized
by buyers who falsely represent that they have received lower offers elsewhere.
This "phantom" or "ghost" competition is sought to be diminished by filing
and circulating the prices of all sellers.2 It is supposed also that unwarranted
price cuts result from sellers' unawareness of their costs. Improved cost ac-
counting methods and dissemination of average cost information are intended
to remedy that situation.3 Distribution of cost information also is thought to
encourage more efficient operation by enabling comparisons of individual with
group or industry costs.4 Overproduction, resulting from inadequate knowledge
of the supply and demand situation in the industry, is still another alleged
source of price instability. This ostensibly is to be corrected by collecting and
distributing figures on unfilled orders, inventories, and production or proposed
production.5
Although this movement has had disinterested supporters,6 and, in time of
war and depression, even governmental encouragement,7 in many instances
"open competition" is nothing more than a device to aid an industry in avoid-
ing risks of price competition. Whenever a number of firms propose jointly to
restrict supply and raise the price in an industry they are confronted with two
major problems. These are: (i) how to make known to members the price or
production policies to be pursued without betraying the fact that an unlawful
restrictive scheme is in force; and (2) how to secure adherence in the face of in-
evitable financial incentives to "overproduce" or "undercut" the noncompeti-
Eddy, The New Competition 86 (1914).
2Burns, The Decline of Competition 6o (1936).
3 Jones, Trade Association Activities and the Law 64-65 (1922); Burns, op. cit. supra note
2, at 47-49.
4 See Pearce, Trade Association Survey (U.S. Temporary National Economic Committee,
Monograph i8, 1941) at 285: "Most cost statistics serve the dual purpose of enlivening the
member's consciousness of the relation of cost to price and of stimulating his interest in the
better and more economical management of his business."
s Jones, op. cit. supra note 3, at 5o-5r; Burns, op. cit. supra note 2, at 55-6o.
6 Herbert Hoover, as Secretary of Commerce, in 1922 wrote a lengthy letter to Attorney
General Daugherty requesting clarification of the legal status of activities he regarded
as helpful not only "to the Department and to the commercial world but to the public gen-
erally." Reprinted in Jones, op. cit. supra note 3, Appendix J, at 324.
In World War I the government relied on trade associations to supply needed industrial
information. See Jones, op. cit. supra note 3, at 53. This precipitated a substantial growth of
the movement. Pearce, op. cit. supra note 5, at 12. The NRA gave trade association statistics
unprecedented status in the 193o's. For discussion of statistical operations in several industries
under the codes, see Whitney, Trade Associations and Industrial Control 61-144 (1934).
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tive price. In meeting these problems the statistical operations of "open com-
petition" have been helpful in a variety of ways.
Reports of prices, costs, and production can provide a simple mechanism
for communicating to members the policies they are to follow.' Recipients of a
report concerning average prices may be expected to raise prices that are below
the reported average. 9 Data as to average costs of a group of typical firms may
be used in the same way, particularly when a normal profit is included in the
"cost." ° When freight rates from a central point to destinations throughout
the country are also distributed, the member firms are enabled to quote uniform
delivered prices.- Cost accounting programs that require the use of an "esti-
mating manual"" or otherwise cause components of total cost to be carried at
a standard amount having no relation to actual cost13 have an obvious utility
in this connection. Estimates of future production of individual producers can
serve as a means of assigning quotas; 4 and production data can be distributed
with the understanding that output is to be reduced whenever stocks exceed a
stated ratio to sales.'s
8 Edwards, Maintaining Competition 25-26 (i949).
9 See indictment, United States v. Philadelphia Wholesale Cleaners and Dyers Ass'n,
U.S.D.C.E.D. Pa., Dkt. No. 15ro (April 25, 1949); indictment, United States v. Brake Lining
Manufacturers Ass'n, U.S.D.C.S.D. N.Y., Dkt. No. C X26/207 (Aug. 21, x947); complaint,
United States v. National Container Ass'n, U.S.D.C.S.D. N.Y., Dkt. No. 8-3r8 (April 2o,
1940).
"o Bums, op. cit. supra note 2, at 50-52. The author remarks that where this has been
done" 'average costs'.. . become merely a suggested selling price, uniform for all, and provide
a means by which to define and detect price cutting.. . ." See Pearce, op. cit. supra note 4,
at 29o: "Cost studies exhibiting average costs, typical costs, and the like no doubt are used
by some members of associations as a basis in determining prices...
"This was done by the Maple Flooring Manufacturers Ass'n. Consult Maple Flooring
Manufacturers Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 571 (x925), where the Court refers to the
practice of antecedent associations.
12 See FTC v. United Typothetae of America, 6 F.T.C. 345 (1923). The FTC enjoined use
of "the Standard Guide," at one time called "the Price List," which actually suggested prices
to be charged based on actual average hour costs for the various operations, plus a recom-
mended 25 per cent profit. Standardized costs for a multitude of operations were compiled
in the book. For a full treatment of accounting manuals, see Pearce, op. cit. supra note 4, at
258-77. See complaint, United States v. Stevenson, Jordan, and Harrison, U.S.D.C.S.D.N.Y.,
Dkt. No. 10-213 (Aug. 22, 1940).
'3 Attorney General Daugherty, answering Secretary Hoover's letter, note 6 supra, re-
ferred to the "strong effort ... made by some lumber associations to take as a basis for esti-
mating costs of production a uniform charge for stumpage." Reprinted in Jones, op. cit.
supra note 3, Appendix J, at 332. Bums, op. cit. supra note 2, at 49, describes the attempt of
cotton-textile, stove and furniture manufacturers to induce members to include raw materials
at replacement cost; the stovemakers association even suggested percentages of the costs of
material to be added for breakages, for plating, for loss and waste, salesmen's costs, and other
items.
'4 See Hartford Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386,427 (1945). The Glass Container
Ass'n was broken up because its statistical committee furnished forecasts of probable future
production which were communicated to members at meetings and were treated as quotas,
deviation from which was discouraged.
"5 See Edwards, op. cit. supra note 8, at 26,
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Price filing most directly aids the enforcement of price agreements when there
is an accompanying agreement to adhere to the filed prices for a fixed period.
This gives others an opportunity to exercise persuasion or intimidation upon
those who threaten to break from the going price. 6 But even if no waiting period
is required, the mere fact that the price cutter is identified will have a restrictive
effect.17 Members have also been kept in line by circulating a list of prices and
representing that lower prices would be a violation of state unfair-sales stat-
utes.-8 Production control, which generally is an accessory to enforcement of
the price agreement, may be achieved by circulating and analyzing production
and inventory figures so that members are induced to curtail production.' 9
False or misleading market information has been disseminated for the purpose
of indicating an expected shortage, thereby deterring immediate price reduc-
tions.2
°
While the courts have not been unaware of these harmful aspects of trade-
association statistics, they have assumed that typically the statistics, by in-
creasing knowledge in the market, are beneficial to competition." For this rea-
'6 This type of price filing agreement was frequently found during the period of NRA
codes. See Whitney, op. cit. supra note 7, at io5 (refined sugar), and at 126 (woolen goods).
For discussion of some evils of the adherence requirement, see Handler, Construction and
Enforcement of the Federal Anti-trust Laws (U.S. Temporary National Economic Com-
mittee Monograph 38, i94i), at 23.
X7 Edwards, op. cit. supra note 8, at 27.
X8 Indictment, United States v. Tennessee Retail Grocers Ass'n, U.S.D.C.M.D. Tenn.
Nashville Div. Dkt. No. 10223 (April 27, 1942); complaint, United States v. Rhode Island
Food Council, Inc., U.S.D.C.R.I., Dkt. No. 157 (Dec. 19, 1941).
9 SeeAmerican Column &Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921) ;.complaint and
consent decree, United States v. West Coast Lumbermen's Ass'n, U.S.D.C.S.D. Cal. Cent.
Div., Dkt. No. 1488-Y (April r6, 194z); indictment, United States v. Western Pine Ass'n,
U.S.D.C.S.D. Cal. Cent. Div., Dkt. No. 14522 (Sept. I8, i94o).
"0 See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 405-8 (X921); com-
plaint, United States v. Washington Wholesale Grocers Ass'n, U.S.D.C.W.D. Wash. No. Div.,
Dkt. No. 538 (July i, 1942).
" Most of the law relating to "open competition" is found in a line of five leading Supreme
Court cases. At the time the first two of these, American Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States, 257 U.S. 377 (X921), and United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371
(x923), were decided, the Court was not sufficiently impressed with the need for market in-
formation to allow the associations to continue their statistical programs. Justices Holmes,
Brandeis and McKenna, dissenting in the American Column & Lumber case, did take the
position that full knowledge of business facts was a worthy objective. This became the majority
position in the next two trade association cases, Maple Flooring Manufacturers Ass'n v.
United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925), and Cement Manufacturers Protective Ass'n v.
United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925), with justices Taft, Sanford and McReynolds of the ma-
jority in the earlier cases dissenting. While there are some distinctions on the facts between the
two pairs of cases, actually only Justice Van Devanter sided with the majority in both. Justice
Stone in the Maple Flooring case, at 582, ciearly states the assumption that now underlies
judicial evaluation of trade-association statistical plans: "It is the consensus of opinion of
economists and of many of the most important agencies of Government that the public
interest is served by the gathering and dissemination, in the widest possible manner, of in-
formation with respect to the production and distributing cost and prices... of market com-
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
son, "open competition" plans are presumptively valid, and the prosecution
has had the burden of proving that in particular cases cost, price, or production
information has actually been used as part of a restrictive scheme. In this
framework, the trade association cases are price-fixing cases in which the under-
lying scheme is to be found inferentially, with the statistical activities providing
one body of evidence from which the inference is to be made. 2 From the points
of view of both the associations and the anti-trust agencies this arrangement is
unsatisfactory. With respect to the former, the fact that each case requires
an inference from many circumstances makes it exceedingly difficult for an
association to know in advance how far it may go in its statistical operations.23
With respect to the latter, the difficult burden of proving an underlying restric-
tive arrangement would be eliminated if courts evaluated more critically the
assumption that cost, price, and other trade information of the kind dispensed
by trade associations is useful to competition. Examination of some prohibitions
frequently recited in the cases will emphasize the difficulties of the associations;
a survey of the law relating specifically to price, cost and production statistics
will indicate that the underlying assumption of utility to competition is ques-
tionable.
I
It is well established that a trade association statistical program must abide
by four "rules": (i) the information must be fully available to all interested
parties; (2) the identity of particular contributors must not be disclosed; (3)
supervisory powers of the association must not be excessive; and (4) the data
must be released without comment, analysis, or subsequent discussion at asso-
modities. .. ." This attitude is manifest in Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553
(1936), in which the Court, while enjoining many of the Institute's practices, permitted re-
porting of current and future prices.
"In cases where there was evidence of uniform pricing methods and price identity as well
as statistical exchange, FTC cease and desist orders have been upheld. U.S. Maltsters Ass'n v.
FTC, 152 F. 2d i61 (C.A. 7 th, I945) (Commission's finding of conspiracy to restrain compe-
tition held to be supported by evidence of uniformity of delivered prices, use of a single basing
point in computing delivered prices, and exchange of freight rate and other trade information);
Milk & Ice Cream Can Institute v. FTC, 152 F. 2d 478 (C.A. 7th, 1946) (Commission's
finding of unlawful combination to restrain competition held to be supported by evidence of
uniformity of delivered prices, a freight equalization plan, and compilation of freight rate
factors); Fort Howard Paper Co. v. FTC, 156 F. 2d 899 (C.A. 7th, x946) (Commission's
finding of conspiracy in restraint of competition held to be supported by evidence of price
uniformity, a two zone pricing system, and the gathering of information by the association);
FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948) (Commission's finding of restraint of competi-
tion held to be supported by evidence of agreement to use a multiple basing-point pricing
system, price and bid uniformity, preparation and distribution of freight rate books, and im-
position of sanction against recalcitrant members).
23 See Handler, op. cit. supra note i6, at ig: "The generality of these decisions, the primacy
given to the facts, and the studied refusal of the Court to formulate any generalizations applica-
ble to other states of facts, have limited their practical value to those interested in discovering
the permissive limits of the statistical activities of trade associations. Uncertainty is not re-
moved by a doctrine which makes each case a law unto itself."
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ciation meetings.24 Nevertheless, complete compliance does not guarantee a
plan's legality any more than does occasional departure from the rules assure
the government's success.
In the American Column & Lumbers and Linseed Oil26 cases secrecy in re-
porting of the data was a particularly objectionable feature of the plans. "With
intimate knowledge of the affairs of other producers... the subscribers went
forth to deal with widely separated and unorganized customers necessarily ig-
norant of the true conditions.' ' 27 On the other hand, the fact that statistics
gathered by the Maple Flooring Association were "given wide publicity" was
considered highly significant by the Court in a later case.28 While an inroad
upon the rule was made in the Sugar Institute case where the Court allowed cer-
tain data of a confidential nature (probably cost figures) to be withheld from
outsiders,29 the requirement, as to prices at least, remains intact. The impor-
tance of publicity as a test of the legality of an association's operations may
best be explained as a result of looking to established information-dispensing
agencies for guidance in judging "open competition." Since the essence of the
operation of such agencies is full and open disclosure of information, failure to
furnish published reports to both buyers and sellers was thought sufficient to
show a purpose beyond the mere supplying of information.3O
The publicity requirement may be met without removing the possibility of
using the published information in connection with a restrictive scheme. Mem-
bers of the association will continue to know, for example, what is the "going
price" and who has deviated from it. From the anti-trust standpoint, therefore,
the absence of secrecy should not insure a finding of lawful behavior. On the
other hand, since nonavailability to outsiders is only one circumstance that
may evidence combination, if on the basis of all the evidence the court is un-
convinced of the existence of an unlawful conspiracy, a high degree of non-
24 That the data should be accurate is too evident to discuss at length. Reports of fictitious
or "washed" sales, elimination of low prices in reporting of sales, and suppression of facts con-
cerning production designed to mislead as to price or production conditions are to be avoided.
See Jones, op. cit. supra note 3, at 61; Kirsh and Shapiro, Trade Association in Law and Busi-
ness 57 (1938).
" American Column &Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
26 United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923).
' Ibid., at 389-go.
Maple Flooring Manufacturers Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 573 (1925).
29 Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936). The Court states that the pur-
chasing and distributing trade do not have a legitimate interest in certain data of a "confi-
dential character," and full publicity of such information might be prejudicial to the re-
finers. Ibid., at 604.
30 See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 411 (1921), where
the Court said: "One distinguishing and sufficient difference is that the published reports go to
both seller and buyer, but these reports go to the seller only. .. ."; United States v. American
Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 390 (1923), where the Court concluded: "The situation here
questioned is wholly unlike an exchange where dealers assemble and buy and sell openly ...."
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availability will be tolerated. In a recent case, Tag Manufacturers Institute v.
FTC, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that the information was
made sufficiently available merely by being open for inspection at the New York
office of the Institute's co-ordinator.3r
An important factor in the American Column & Lumber case was that the
association sent out to members information as to production, sales, stocks, and
prices in which the identity of producers, sellers, and purchasers was revealed.32
Approval of the statistical plan of the Maple Flooring Association resulted, at
least in part, because names of purchasers and identification of mills making
reports were omitted.33 Complete disclosure of this kind probably was regarded
as significant by the Supreme Court for two reasons: (i) ordinarily businessmen
do not so completely inform their rivals as to details of their business;34 and (2)
disclosing the identity of customers and the specific facts of each sale do not
improve the general value of the statistics, that is, other agencies dispensing
trade information do so without breaking down the figures so as to identify
particularly concerns. 35 The Court in the Cement Manufacturers case,36 how-
ever, allowed the practice of reporting specific job contracts between identified
parties. In all other respects the Court was satisfied that the association's pro-
gram did not evidence a restrictive purpose. The Court rationalized its result
by finding that this departure from what it considered the normal practice of
exchanges could be explained as an attempt to avoid losses to which sellers of
cement were subject due to the peculiar terms on which cement was sold.37
Price leadership and the policing of price and production agreements may be
31 i74 F. 2d 452 (1949). The Commission had found that purchasers and consumers located
outside the New York area had not benefited from the price lists. The court concluded: "We
are clearly of the opinion that if the reporting agreement is otherwise unobjectionable, it can-
not be said to have become illegal for failure of the subscribers to make the information gen-
erally available...." Ibid., at 462.
32American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 394-96 (1921).
33 Maple Flooring Manufacturers Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 573 (1925).
34 See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 410 (1921):
"Genuine competitors do not make daily, weekly and monthly reports of the minutest de-
tails of their business to their rivals ..... "; United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262
U.S. 371, 389 (1923). The plan "took away theirfreedom of action by requiring each to reveal
the intimate details of its affairs."
35 See Kirsh and Shapiro, op. cit. supra note 24, at 57-58.
36 Cement Manufacturers Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
37 Cement was always sold for use in a specific piece of construction. The obligation was that
the manufacturer should furnish and the contractor take only what was required for that par-
ticular job. The purchaser was to pay nothing until after delivery, he was not obliged to take
the cement unless he chose to, and he was not held to the contract price f the market declined.
On the other hand, in case of a market advance, the seller could be held for delivery of the
full amount required by the job contract. Thus the contractor took no risk in contracting
with several manufacturers for a single job and taking delivery of more than was required
for it alone if the market price rose. Filing of specific job contracts was allegedly for the pur-
pose of preventing this kind of exploitation.
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more difficult in the absence of identification of particular firms, but this does
not necessarily mean that there is no such joint undertaking. Enforcement and
price guidance still may be forthcoming from the association headquarters
which usually will know the identity of reporting firms. One solution, from the
anti-trust standpoint, is to require that tabulations be made by an independent
agency; but even if this is done the association's power to audit the records of
its members gives it access to the same information.38
While complete restriction of the power to audit is exceptional, it has con-
sistently been recognized that too complete supervisory power suggests the
likelihood of coercion. In the Linseea Oil case the Court found that the members
deposited with an "autocratic Bureau" large funds "to insure their obedience"
to the reporting agreement.39 The significance of such provisions is that they
represent a surrender of independence inconsistent with true competitive be-
havior. However, where, as in the Tag Manufacturers case, the court finds the
plan as a whole innocent, the mere presence of a penal provision will not imply
an unlawful undertaking.4O Thus, supervision necessary to the effective opera-
tion of the reporting plan will be allowed, and this may include the imposition of
pecuniary fines. But absence of "drastic supervision" does not necessarily spell
out competitive behavior, since the enlightened self-interest of participants
may be enough to insure their obedience to a restrictive plan.4'
The American Column & Lumber case made it clear that comment upon,
and analysis and discussion of, trade data was an indication of group pressure
to act in conformity with a joint plan.42 It is evident that where this is done
more than mere statistical information is disseminated-significant clues may
be dispensed as to what prices members should charge or what quantities they
should produce. The clear-cut prohibition of comment on statistics contained
in American Column & Lumber was somewhat eroded by the Court in Maple
Flooring. Discussion of cost statistics was permitted and no significance was
attached to the circumstance that "upon occasion the trend of future prices be-
38 Some consent decrees have specifically restricted the auditing or examining of records or
accounts. United States v. West Coast Lumbermen's Ass'n, U.S.D.C.S.D. Cal. Cent. Div.,
Dkt. No. 1488-Y (April 16, 1941); United States v. Western Pine Ass'n, U.S.D.C.S.D. Cal.
Cent. Div., Dkt. No. x389-RJ (Feb. 6, 194r).
39 United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 389 (1923).
40 Tag Manufacturers Institute v. FTC, 174 F. 2d 452, 4631 (1949). The court was careful
to point out that violators of the reporting agreement were not subject to "penalties," but
were assessed "liquidated damages" where the breach resulted in "probable actual damages."
But, regardless of this distinction, "[i]f the reporting commitments they are designed to
buttress are otherwise lawful, the agreement does not become a violation of the anti-trust
laws... merely because the reporting plan is accompanied by a penalty provision.. .."
41 See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 399 (192i), where
the Court observes: "The sanctions of the plan obviously are, financial interest, intimate per-
sonal contact, and business honor, all operating under the restraint of exposure of what
would be deemed bad faith and of trade punishment by powerful rivals."
41 Ibid., at 398-99 •
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came the subject of discussion outside the meetings."43 This is but another
demonstration of the fact that decisions in the trade association cases are in-
ferences from conglomerations of facts, no one of which is controlling. Evidence
of comment and discussion will always be important, but, like evidence of other
practices, not necessarily decisive.
U
In the Maple Flooring case the association had obeyed all the general rules
announced in the earlier cases, and, with respect to price information, "All
reports of sales and prices dealt exclusively with past and closed transactions."44
For some time it was thought that this expressed the law concerning open-price
systems: current and future price reporting was conclusive or, at least, pre-
sumptive evidence of unlawful behavior; while information about prices no
longer in effect, which could not be the basis for fixing current prices, was not.
The Sugar Institute decision, however, strongly indicated that the "past and
closed transactions" doctrine was not to be taken too seriously. In that case the
district court had, in an exhaustive and carefully written opinion, found illegal
an elaborate price reporting scheme.4S The Supreme Court affirmed, relying
mainly on the circumstance that the members were required to adhere, without
deviation, to the filed price and terms; but in so doing it eliminated the part of
the decree enjoining the reporting or relaying of current or future prices.46 The
special circumstance that sugar was traditionally sold on "moves" which were
precipitated by advance announcement of a price rise perhaps limits the force
of the decision to such a situation; but at least three interpretations were made
by the experts. 47 The anti-trust division persists in regarding information of past
prices as somehow safer than current or future price reports.4 However, the
court in the Tag Manufacturers case refused to distinguish between past and
43 Maple Flooring Manufacturers Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 575 (1925).
44 Ibid., at 573.
45 United States v. Sugar Institute, 15 F. Supp. 8,7 (N.Y., 1934).
46 Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 603 (1936).
47The decision is closely limited in this connection to the particular factual situation;
Handler, op. cit. supra note z6, at 22. While the Court speaks of historic usage, it sanctions
a plan of future price reporting that other industries may be able to adopt. Fly, Observations
on the Anti-trust Laws, Economic Theory and the Sugar Institute Decisions: I, 45 Yale L.J.
1339, 1363 (xg36). The decision expressly authorizes the distribution of current price informa-
tion where it is not for the purpose of fixing prices. Donovan, The Effect of the Decision in the
Sugar Institute Case upon Trade Association Activities, 84 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 929, 939 (i936).
48 Consent decree, United States v. Western Pine Ass'n, U.S.D.C.S.D. Cal. Cent. Div.,
Dkt. No. i389 -RJ (Feb. 6, 194i) (dissemination of current prices absolutely prohibited;
past price information permitted under specified conditions); consent decree, United States
v. Electrical Solderless Service Connector Institute, U.S.D.C.S.D.N.Y., Dkt. No. 12-217
(Jan. 4, 194I) (institute enjoined from disseminating information concerning prices other than
those in actually consummated sales or bona fide contracts to sell).
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current price information, although recognizing explicitly that reports of exist-
ing prices were not merely reports of past events. 49
The Sugar Institute case did make clear that price filing would be viewed
unfavorably if there was any obligation not to depart from filed prices. Such a
requirement is coercive and so is inconsistent with true competition. An agree-
ment to abide by a filed price, when, in fact, all prices are apt to be identical,
and an agreement to adhere to prices contained in a price list circulated by a
trade association are much alike.5o The thrust of the rule is that participants in a
price-filing program should be perfectly free to modify their prices without be-
ing subject to the necessity of waiting for a specified period until the proposed
change can go into effect, a period during which the changer may be subject
to persuasion and intimidation. In this connection, the freedom of members of
the Tag Manufacturers Institute to sell "off list" was a significant factor in
causing the court to reverse the FTC's finding of conspiracy in restraint of
competition.
Thus, open-price systems are at least presumptively unlawful when future
prices are transmitteds5 or when members agree to adhere to filed prices. Cur-
rent price reporting is presumptively valid, even though reports of the industry
average price may serve to indicate what each participant in a collusive scheme
is to charge.5' The government is required to prove the underlying scheme be-
cause the courts are convinced that the "beneficial and curative agency of pub-
licity should not be unnecessarily hampered."s3 In the case of current price in-
formation, however, the contribution to competition seems inconsequential.
The reports typically are not released until individual firms have announced
their prices to the trade.54 Moreover sellers are able to get price information from
buyers, as is indicated by the recent statement of a prominent steel executive:
"It is an amazing thing. If somebody in the steel industry makes a change in
price, it is all through the steel industry before noon if it has been made that
morning, the information coming from the customers."5 Further, it has been
49 Tag Manufacturers Institute v. FTC, z74 F. 2d 452, 457, 463 (C.A. ist, 1949).
so Compare FTC v. Pacific States Paper Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52 (,927).
s, This does not mean that circulation of current prices that will continue into the future
renders the plan presumptively invalid.
S2 This is especially true in industries like the tag industry where are sold a great variety
of products made up of various combinations of basic parts. Reports of the prevailing price
of the components provide a ready-made pricing formula without which price-fixing would be
difficult if not impossible. Compare complaint, United States v. National Container Ass'n,
U.S.D.C.S.D.N.Y., Dkt. No. 8-318 (April 20, 1940).
s3 Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 6oi (1936).
S4 Pearce, op. cit. supra note 5, at 199: "Characteristically, price lists are forwarded to the
association office only after or at the time they are issued to the trade by the individual
members."
ss Statement of Ernest T. Weir, Chairman, National Steel Corp. in Hearings before House
Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power, Sist Cong. 2d Sess. Part 4A (Steel), at 82o
(1g9o).
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persuasively argued that competition, far from depending on complete knowl-
edge of prices, thrives on ignorance among sellers. The sense of this proposition
is that a seller's propensity to lower his price will be greater if he feels there is a
reasonable chance that it will not immediately be matched by his competitors.56
In a scientific age trade association attempts to establish uniform cost-
accounting methods have received friendly treatment by the courts. Some-
times, however, such cost-accounting programs have emphasized uniformity
to the extent that little room was left for individual determination of items of
cost.5 7 Where that is the case, the cost-accounting program presumably is di-
rected at enabling sellers to compute uniform selling prices and so is strong
evidence of an unlawful arrangement. Thus while a trade association may in-
troduce and encourage the adoption of uniform cost-accounting methods, it is
important that the figures used in the accounting process be based on actual
experience of the firm rather than on arbitrary or fictitious information sup-
plied by the association~5 A number of recent consent decrees have enjoined
the promotion of uniform cost-accounting systems.5 9
The practice of disseminating average-cost figures has accompanied the
growth of cost accounting, and, allegedly, technical economies have resulted.
The Maple Flooring case established the legality of reporting of industry cost
figures, at least so long as reporting plants were unidentified, the data was
generally available, and the computations were accurately made.6° Underlying
this encouragement of dissemination of cost figures is the belief that it is bene-
ficial to competition, but little support for that notion is offered by the actual
practice of the Maple Flooring Association during the 1920's. Periodically the
Association would announce the average costs of producing various grades of
lumber in test runs made in several unnamed mills, the results being consoli-
dated and considered as one. To supplement this, the Association distributed
average delivered-cost charts which showed the average cost plus freight to
destinations throughout the United States from Cadillac, Michigan. The Court
recognized that this kind of information "could be made the basis of fixing prices
s6 See Adelman, Effective Competition and the Anti-trust Laws, 6i Harv. L. Rev. 1289,
1299 (1948): "Some urncertainty, some good gambling chance that price cuts will not be im-
mediately met, is necessary for effective competition."
S7 See note 12 supra.
Ss See consent decree, United States v. W. C. Bell Services, U.S.D.C. Colo., Dkt. No. 380
(Oct. 27, 1941); consent decree, United States v. National Container Ass'n, U.S.D.C.S.D.
N.Y., Dkt. No. 8-318 (April 20, 1940).
59 United States v. Wallpaper Institute, U.S.D.C.E.D. Pa., Dkt. No. 8621 (June 8, 195o);
United States v. West Coast Lumbermen's Ass'n, U.S.D.C.S.D. Cal. Cent. Div., Dkt. No.
1488-Y (April 36, i941); United States v. Western Pine Ass'n, U.S.D.C.S.D. Cal. Cent. Div.,
Dkt. No. i389-RJ (Feb. 6, 1941).
60 Other restrictions attending statistical programs have been relaxed in connection with
cost statistics. Discussion of cost information was allowed in the Maple Flooring case, and
Sugar Institute indicated that it may not be required that cost data be made available to
buyers.
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or for an agreement for price maintenance," but it did not find evidence in the
record that the information had been so used. A number of letters found in the
record, however, strongly suggest that competition had little vitality among
the maple flooring producers. For example, one producer suggested a meeting
to go over the market situation "especially since we have had complaints...
of greatly cut prices ... that we may be able to trace out";61 while another
wrote, "I immediately got in touch with him and explained the unfairness of
doing this [reducing prices] without it being brought up in meeting and prop-
erly discussed so that any change could be put in effect by all at once." 6' It is
significant that in the leading case approving dissemination of cost information
there should be such convincing evidence that something other than competi-
tion was being served by the statistics.
It is also highly probable that group and industry average-cost figures in
other situations have not benefited competition. Allegedly they lead to adop-
tion of techniques which resulted in cost savings for the low-cost firms,63 but
processes economical for one firm would not necessarily be so for others with
their own unique problems of location, size, and personnel. Moreover, when the
reporting firms are unidentified as the law requires, it becomes impossible to
associate low costs with particular processes and techniques. Knowledge that
his costs are greater than the industry average is not necessary to encourage
competitive producers to reduce costs since it always pays him to operate as
efficiently as possible. The general situation has been described as follows: "The
primary purpose in compiling average-cost data is to encourage study of in-
dividual costs, but too often there is a reverse effect, the manufacturer using
average costs for the industry to arrive at a sales figure for his product .... ,,14
It appears that the association distributing cost figures should have the burden
of proving a purpose consistent with competition.
Dissemination of inventory and production statistics have frequently been
components of "open competition" plans. Their purpose, ostensibly, is to en-
able members of the industry to follow a "realistic" production policy by virtue
of knowing the true supply and demand situation. In line with the prevailing
attitude that dissemination of information that makes economic behavior more
rational is to be encouraged, distribution of such data is presumed lawful except
in special cases.65 This is true in spite of the fact that production data may be of
61 Gov't Exhibit No. 5I-2.
62 Gov't Exhibit No. 5r-E.E.
6 See Pearce, op. cit. supra note 5, at 286. This survey describes briefly some situations
where cost studies were used for this purpose, and the results reported by the association staffs.
64 Ibid., at 281, quoted from Dept. of Commerce, Trade Association Activities 34 (1927).
6s The American Column & Lumber case indicated that production reports accompanied
by comment and analysis at association meetings are evidence of noncompetitive behavior,
particularly when individual firms are identified. Estimates of future production have beenheld unlawful as a device for assigning production quotas. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United
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considerable value in implementing a scheme of market control. When in-
dividual and industry outputs are computed, and there is a concerted under-
taking to restrict production, individual firms will be encouraged to cooperate
if the figures disclose that their percentage of the total has not declined.6 Or
production and inventory statistics may reflect (or show) brighter business
prospects and thereby serve to deter particular firms from increased sales
efforts when sales are falling off. 7 Where there is a division of the market with
each firm assigned a fixed percentage, production figures of the industry enable
the computation of individual quotas.
Like price and cost information, production and inventory statistics make
most economic sense in other than a competitive context. The business fore-
casts invariably implied by, if not expressed in conjunction with, this informa-
tion are the kind which under competition are made independently by indi-
vidual enterprisers. Central judgment attempts to replace individual decision.
If competition is active, the forecasts will be ignored and production determined
according to the estimates of the individual, in which case the statistics are
useless. If the industry, no longer competitive, takes its cue from the informa-
tion supplied by the central office, it is plain that there is scant reason to en-
courage the dissemination of this type of information.
MIl
As a practical matter trade associations may not be as free to collect and dis-
seminate prices and trade statistics as the precedents indicate. Slight changes
in the facts presented to the court may justify an inference of conspiracy to fix
prices, although the statistical operations themselves are not basically different
from those approved in the cases. The anti-trust division continues to bring in-
dictments and complaints against associations which seem to have complied
with the technical requirements laid down in the cases." These suits usually end
in consent decrees and are never litigated. This may mean that the associations
are insecure enough about the legality of what they are doing to wish to avoid
an adverse decision that might be used against them in a suit for treble damages.
States, 323 U.S. 386, 427 (1945). When production data is presented in juxtaposition to repre-
sentations of "normal" production or of orders and shipments so that the expected production
policy can be easily inferred, there may be evidence to support an inference of illegal behavior.
See complaint, United States v. West Coast Lumbermen's Ass'n, U.S.D.C.S.D. Cal. Cent.
Div., Dkt. No. 1488-Y (April 16, 1941); complaint, United States v. Western Pine Ass'n,
U.S.D.C.S.D. Cal. Cent. Div., Dkt. No. 1389-RJ (Feb. 6, I94).
66 See Jones, op. cit. supra note 3, at 47-48; Burns, op. cit. supra note 2, at 58.
67 See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 405 (1923).
68 The indictments and complaints, of course, charge price-fixing which has never been
condoned in the cases; but as to the statistical programs, there is frequently no charge that the
data was kept secret, that it disclosed individual positions, that there was excessive super-
vision, that there was unauthorized comment and discussion, or that adherence to filed prices
was required.
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It may mean that the cost of litigation is prohibitive in light of the value of the
statistical exchange for legitimate or illegitimate purposes. The main signifi-
cance of the consent decrees is as testimony that adherence to the lines estab-
lished in the cases is no guarantee of freedom from the risks of anti-trust prose-
cution.
That too much confidence is not to be reposed in prior judicial pronounce-
ments is well illustrated by the Cement Institute case decided by the Supreme
Court in 1948.69 Respondents were the same producers that comprised the
defendant association in the Cement Manufacturers case in which the associa-
tion was exonerated of any unlawful practices. In the intervening period there
was no material change in the activities carried on, but in Count I of the com-
plaint the price-fixing charge was made explicit and new evidence was pre-
sented in support of it. Startling identity of bids and evidence of coercive
measures taken against noncomplying producers were among the factors setting
the two cases apart and enabling the Court to sustain the Commission's finding
of a combination to fix prices via a multiple basing-point system.70 While the
Cement Institute case was partly a basing-point price-discrimination case, it was
also a price-fixing case and the implications for trade associations are clear.
New evidence may cause the demise of a previously accepted system of statis-
tical reporting. However, the burden of proving the underlying conspiracy re-
mains with the prosecution. If, in view of the obvious utility of such statistics
for restrictive purposes and their scant value to competition, "open competi-
tion" were to be made presumptively invalid, trade-association sponsors of
such programs would have to be prepared to prove their innocence. In many
areas the public would benefit.
69 FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (948).
7o Ibid., at 716.
